Editorial Reviews. Review. ” Westerhoff’s commentary is lucid, philosophically engaging, and included ample references for the serious student of Indian or. The Dispeller of Disputes This page intentionally left blank The Dispeller of Disputes N¯ag¯arjuna’s Vigrahavy¯avar. The Dispeller of Disputes – Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani — translated and commented by Jan Westerhoff · A short work by the.

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For how do we know that the self-establishment of the epistemic instruments really is an indication of epistemic veracity and not of something else?

For an illusion to work, at least some things must be truly existent. Stefano Gandolfo – – Journal of Indian Philosophy 44 2: Amazon Advertising Find, attract, and engage customers. Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani on your Kindle in under a minute. Each simple term is connected with its referent in the world. Start reading The Dispeller of Disputes: To this extent there is no thing apprehended by perception, the epistemic instrument.

However, in this case the negation of the substance in things is brought about by substanceless speech. Furthermore, if for you the establishment of the epistemic objects is by the epistemic instruments and the establishment of the epistemic instruments by the epistemic objects, neither is established for you.

Again, there are two passages closely similar to the point made here, in Vaidalyaprakaran. It is also evident how the example of illusion presented in verse 23 refutes the above discussion in six points.

The opponent takes this to mean that the thesis in question does not exist, and is therefore unable to do any work in an argument. Now put both of them in a so-called Ames room, a room compressed in one corner so that objects placed there look taller than they are in fact.

In this way the auspicious things have an auspicious substance. Given the problems of the alternative picture he provides, this is in fact the preferable option. If my speech is not in the cause, not among the great elements, neither in the collection of conditions nor distinct from it, if it is not in the action of the chest, the throat, the lips, the root of the teeth, the palate, the nose, the head, and so forth, if it is not in the combination of those, is not free from the combination of causes and conditions, not distinct from them—to this extent it is without substance, and because it is without substance it is empty.


But then, the opponent will object, his thesis will never get out of the domain of conventions and connect up with the real world, in the way the statements of the opponent, which are to be supplied with a realist semantics, do. It is a conceptual construct. And if this is true then at least the central terms of the Buddhist world-view refer to objects that are not empty, so that this world-view proves to be incompatible with the thesis of universal emptiness. Oxford Scholarship Online This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level.

The Dispeller of Disputes

Suppose someone argued that the son is to be produced by the father because if the father did not exist, the son would not exist, eitherbut that the father is also produced by the son since if the son did not exist, that man would not be a father. I venerate the one who taught emptiness, dependent origination, and the middle way as one thing, the incomparable Buddha. One we reject this semantic doctrine, the problem disappears. An integer a is a predecessor of b if a is closer to zero than b, if it is further away than b it is a successor.

Both illusion-producer and illusion-remover can be entities of the same kind. The analogy does not succeed because whether we see the sound as preventing the existence or as establishing the non-existence of another sound, it is always an existent sound which does this.


If perception existed substantially, who would remove the perception? Establishing the epistemic instruments on the basis of the objects does not seem to be a disputws promising route.

Nagarjuna is never an easy read at the best of times so I quite often re-read passages more than once sometimes more than twice. Once we accept that, nothing will keep us from repeating this move as often as we want.

The Dispeller of Disputes: Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani

In this way there there will an argumentational deadlock where all each side can do is insist that their position is right. Emptiness and Reasons [17—19, 68] 3. If people who know the state of things speak of the auspicious things, the auspicious substance should be expressed in terms of a detailed division. Perception is not established by something else, by inference, likeness, or testimony; inference by perception, likeness, or testimony; likeness by perception, inference, or testimony; testimony by perception, inference, or likeness.

The Dispeller of Disputes: Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani – PDF Free Download

And if the denial of substance is established for you without a reason, the existence of substantiality cispeller also established for me without a reason. Extrinsic Disputez [10, 60] 3. The Dispeller of Disputes: This would have the advantage of giving a numerical progression which increases in size. At the level of conventional truth the two relations are distinct, and so the two cases cannot be seen as analogous at this level. There remains one issue in this passage to consider.

In this case they would have to have existed for ever, and continue to do so in the future. To this extent, for you everything compounded becomes not compounded.